In the model of restricted parallel links, n users must be routed on m parallel links under the restriction that the link for each user be chosen from a certain set of allowed links for the user. In a (pure) Nash equilibrium, no user may improve its own Individual Cost (latency) by unilaterally switching to another link from its set of allowed links. The Price of Anarchy is a widely adopted measure of the worst-case loss (relative to optimum) in system performance (maximum latency) incurred in a Nash equilibrium.
Abstract
In the model of restricted parallel links, n users must be routed on m parallel links under the restriction that the link for each user be chosen from a certain set of allowed links for the user. In a (pure) Nash equilibrium, no user may improve its own Individual Cost (latency) by unilaterally switching to another link from its set of allowed links. The Price of Anarchy is a widely adopted measure of the worst-case loss (relative to optimum) in system performance (maximum latency) incurred in a Nash equilibrium.
In this work, we present a comprehensive collection of bounds on Price of Anarchy for the model of restricted parallel links. Specifically, we prove:
• For the case of identical users and identical links, the Price of Anarchy is Ω lg m lg lg m .
• For the case of identical users, the Price of Anarchy is O lg n lg lg n .
• For the case of identical links, the Price of Anarchy is O lg m lg lg m , which is asymptotically tight.
• For the most general case of arbitrary users and related links, the Price of Anarchy is at least m − 1 and less than m.
The shown bounds reveal the dependence of the Price of Anarchy on n and m for all possible assumptions on users and links.
1. Introduction
Framework
In the model of restricted parallel links, n non-cooperative users must route their unsplittable traffics (or weights) on m parallel links from a source node to a sink node. Each link has a capacity and the latency through a link is the ratio of the total traffic assigned to the link over its capacity. Since the latencies incurred on different links due to the same traffic are ordered by their capacities, we say that links are related.
A distinguishing feature of the model of restricted parallel links is the restriction that the link for each user must be chosen from a certain set of allowed links for the user. This restriction corresponds to an important special case of the job scheduling problem on unrelated machines, where only a subset of the users are allowed to use a machines but otherwise machines are related. On the other hand, the model is a generalization of the well studied KP model for selfish routing [11] that permits considering a set of allowed links for each user.
In a (pure) Nash equilibrium [13, 14] , each user is minimizing its Individual Cost, which is the latency on the link it chooses. So, a Nash equilibrium represents a stable state of the system in which no user has an incentive to unilaterally switch links. There is also a global objective function called Social Cost [11] , which is the makespan (maximum latency); however, users do not adhere to it. The Price of Anarchy (or Coordination Ratio) [11, 15] is the worst-case ratio of the Social Cost of a Nash equilibrium over the Social Cost of an optimal assignment. The Price of Anarchy is a measure of the worst-case system performance loss (relative to optimum) in a Nash equilibrium; it has been studied very intensively in the last few years.
Contribution
We present a comprehensive collection of bounds on Price of Anarchy for the model of restricted parallel links; we only consider pure Nash equilibria. Some of the bounds apply to the special case of identical users (resp., identical links) where all weights (resp., capacities) equal 1.
• For the simplest case of identical users and identical links, we present a counterexample to prove that the Price of Anarchy is Ω lg m lg lg m (Theorem 3.1).
• We then consider the case of identical users for which we prove that the Price of Anarchy is O lg n lg lg n (Theorem 4.2). The proof establishes that a number of users significantly larger than the Price of Anarchy is necessary; we then employ a careful analysis to establish the claimed upper bound on the Price of Anarchy.
• For the case of identical links, we prove that the Price of Anarchy is O lg m lg lg m (Theorem 5.3). The proof uses the same techniques as those for the case of identical users.
• We finally consider the most general case of arbitrary users and related links, for which we prove that the Price of Anarchy is at least m − 1 (Theorem 6.5) and less than m (Theorem 6.6). For the lower bound, we present a counterexample. For the upper bound, we establish that a number of links larger than the Price of Anarchy is necessary; we then employ a careful analysis to establish the claimed upper bound on the Price of Anarchy.
The shown bounds shed light on the dependence of the Price of Anarchy on n and m for all possible assumptions on users and links. Moreover, our bounds imply a separation with respect to Price of Anarchy between the general case of arbitrary users and related links and each of the two special cases of identical users and identical links, respectively.
Related Work
Independently of our work, Awerbuch et al. [2] also have studied the model of restricted parallel links. Awerbuch et al. [2] focused on the case of arbitrary users and identical links, for which they proved that the Price of Anarchy is O lg m lg lg m for pure Nash equilibria (cf. Theorem 5.3) and Θ lg m lg lg lg m for all (mixed) Nash equilibria.
Tight bounds on the Price of Anarchy for the KP model [11] were proven in [4, 10] for the case of identical links (Θ lg m lg lg m for all Nash equilibria), and in [4] [6, 7, 8, 9, 12] . Suri et al. [17] studied a variant of the model of restricted parallel links where the Social Cost is the total latency, as opposed to maximum latency. (A corresponding variant of the KP model has been studied already in [9] .) For this variant, Suri et al. [17] prove some constant bounds on Price of Anarchy. Two recent papers [1, 3] already generalize the results of Suri et al. [17] to some more general classes of (network) congestion games [16] .
Elsässer et al. [5] studied a further restriction of the model of restricted parallel links, called interaction graphs, where all sets of allowed links for the users have size 2. The results of Elsässer et al. [5] for their model include bounds on Price of Anarchy. In particular, Elsässer et al. [5, Theorem 3] prove that Ω lg m lg lg m is still a lower bound on Price of Anarchy for the case of identical users and identical links in the more restricted model of interaction graphs.
Organization
Section 2 summarizes the model of restricted parallel links. Section 3 considers the case of identical users and identical links. The case of identical users and related links is considered in Section 4. The symmetric case of arbitrary users and identical links is considered in Section 5. Section 6 considers the case of arbitrary users and related links. We conclude in Section 7.
Restricted Parallel Links
Throughout, denote for each positive integer m, [m] = {1, . . . , m}; take that [0] = ∅. For any integer k ≥ 1, the Gamma Function Γ is defined by Γ(k + 1) = k!. Both Γ and its inverse Γ −1 are monotone increasing. It is well known that for any integer
We consider a network consisting of a set of m parallel links 1, . . . , m from a source node to a sink node. Each of n users 1, . . . , n wishes to route a particular amount of traffic along a (non-fixed) link from source to sink. Assume throughout that m ≥ 2 and n ≥ 2.
Denote w i the weight of user i ∈ [n]. Assume, without loss of generality, that w 1 ≥ . . . ≥ w n , and denote W = i∈[n] w i . The weight vector w is the tuple of all weights. In the case of identical users, all weights equal 1; weights vary arbitrarily in the case of arbitrary users. 
Associated with each user
, as the set of allowed links for user i; thus, user i can only be assigned to a link from L i . So, a strategy for user i is some link from its set of allowed links
n . An assignment L = l 1 , . . . , l n ∈ L is a tuple of strategies, one for each user.
Fix now an assignment L. The load ∆ j (L) on link j is the sum of weights of users assigned to link j; thus,
Associated with an instance w, c and an assignment L is the Social Cost [11, Section 2], denoted SC (w, c, L), which is the maximum, over all links, latency due to the load through the link; so,
. Associated with an instance w, c is the Optimum [11, Section 2], denoted OPT (w, c), which is the least possible, over all assignments, of the maximum, over all links, latency due to the load through the link; so,
so, a satisfied user cannot decrease its Individual Cost by switching to a different allowed link. Say that L is a Nash equilibrium [14] if all users are satisfied in L.
The Price of Anarchy [11, 15] (also known as Coordination Ratio [11, Section 2]), denoted PoA, is the worst-case ratio SC (w, c, L) OPT (w, c) over all instances w, c and Nash equilibria L; thus,
OPT (w, c) .
Identical Users and Identical Links
We prove: Theorem 3.1 Consider the case of identical users and identical links. Then,
Proof: Consider an instance w, c with n users and m links. We construct the strategy sets of the users as follows. Fix some sufficiently large integer p (to be determined later).
• Partition the set of links into p + 1 disjoint subsets M 0 , M 1 , . . . , M p with:
• Partition the set of users into p disjoint subsets U 0 , U 1 , . . . , U p−1 with:
-The strategy set of each user in
We now construct a Nash equilibrium L and an optimal assignment Q such that SC (w, c, L) = p and SC (w, c, Q) = 1.
• Construct an assignment L as follows.
-All p users from the set U 0 are assigned to the single link in M 0 .
-For each integer k, where 1 ≤ k ≤ p − 1, p − k users from U k are assigned to each link in M k . (Note that no user is assigned to any link in M p .)
By the construction of L, the latency on each link in the set M l , where 0 ≤ l ≤ p, is p − l. Thus, for each integer l, where 0 ≤ l ≤ p − 1, no user assigned to a link in the set M l can decrease its Individual Cost by switching either to a different link from the set M l or to a link from the set M l+1 . So, all users are satisfied in L and L is a Nash equilibrium with
• Note that |M 0 | + |M 1 | = p and |U 0 | = p. Note also that for each integer k,
So, it is possible to assign each user in U 0 to a distinct link in M 0 ∪ M 1 , and to assign each user in U k , where 1 ≤ k ≤ p − 1, to a distinct link in M k+1 . Call Q the resulting assignment. Then, SC (w, c, Q) = 1 and Q is optimal. So, OPT (w, c) = 1.
It follows that
as needed. Theorem 3.1 implies that Ω lg m lg lg m is a lower bound on the Price of Anarchy for the more general cases of arbitrary users or related links (or of both).
Identical Users
We prove: Theorem 4.2 Consider the case of identical users. Then,
Proof: Consider any arbitrary instance w, c with an associated Nash equilibrium L such that
for some integer p ∈ N, and an optimal assignment Q. To prove an upper bound on the Price of Anarchy, it suffices to prove an upper bound on p + 1. To do so, we will prove a lower bound (as a function of p) on the number of users that are necessary for such a Nash equilibrium L. We will then use this lower bound to prove an upper bound of O lg n lg lg n on p + 1. We continue with the details of the formal proof.
Consider now a link j ∈ [m] with c j < 1 OPT (w, c)
. Note that in the optimal assignment Q, no user is assigned to link j (since otherwise OPT (w, c) ). If, in addition, Λ j (L) < SC (w, c, L), then link j can be eliminated (together with all users assigned to it in L) with no change to SC (w, c, L) and no increase to OPT (w, c). So, assume, without loss of generality, that for each
Define M 0 as the set of links j ∈ [m] with latency
Clearly, M 0 = ∅. By definition of latency, this implies that
We prove an inductive claim:
(1) Clearly, in Q, all these excess users are assigned to links in M 1 , so that
We now prove the four claimed properties for the set M 1 .
• Clearly,
which proves (1).
• To prove (2), consider any link j ∈ M 1 . Since j ∈ M 0 , it follows that
.
Consider any link j ∈ M 0 to which L assigns some excess user. Since L is a Nash equilibrium,
However, by definition of the set M 0 ,
and the proof of (2) is now complete.
• To prove (3), we use (2) and (1) to derive that
as needed for proving (3).
• Recall first that in the optimal assignment Q,
. By definition of latency, this implies that
Clearly, the number of users assigned by L to links in M 0 ∪M 1 whose strategy sets include links outside M 0 ∪ M 1 is at least
as needed for proving (4).
The proof of the basis case is now complete. Assume inductively that for some integer l ≥ 2, the claim holds for all integers not exceeding (l − 1). We will prove the claim for l.
By induction hypothesis (condition (4)), there are at least (p − 1) Clearly, in Q, all these excess users are assigned to links in M l , so that
We now prove the four claimed properties for the set M l .
OPT (w, c)
• To prove (2), consider any link j ∈ M l . Since j ∈ M 0 , it follows that
Recall that in the optimal assignment Q,
It follows that there is some excess user assigned to some link j ∈ M l−1 . Since L is a Nash equilibrium,
By induction hypothesis (condition (2)),
The Price of Anarchy for Restricted Parallel Links as needed for proving (3).
Clearly, the number of users assigned by L to links in M 0 ∪ . . . ∪ M l whose strategy sets include links outside M 0 ∪ . . . M l is at least
The proof of the inductive claim is now complete.
We now prove an upper bound on p + 1. Fix any link j ∈ M 0 . Clearly,
Assume, without loss of generality, that p ≥ 3 (otherwise k + 1 ∈ O(1)). Then,
as needed. We remark that Theorems 3.1 and 4.2 leave a gap between our bounds on Price of Anarchy for the case of identical users. Closing this gap remains an interesting open problem.
Identical Links
With a similar proof as in Theorem 4.2, we can prove an upper bound that matches asymptotically the lower bound shown in Theorem 3.1. We remark that in the interesting cases where n ≥ m, Theorems 3.1 and 5.4 provide asymptotically tight bounds on Price of Anarchy for the case of identical users and identical links.
The General Case
We first prove the lower bound: Theorem 6.5 Consider the case of arbitrary users and related links. Then, PoA ≥ m − 1.
Proof: Consider an instance w, c as follows:
• For each link j ∈ [m], the capacity c j is
• There are n = m − 1 users; the weight of user i ∈ [m − 1] is w i = c i .
Moreover, assume that for each user i
• Construct an assignment L as follows:
Each user i ∈ [m − 1] is assigned to link i + 1.
We will argue that all users are satisfied in L.
-Note that the Individual Cost of each user i
On the other hand,
It follows that user
-Consider now user 1. Since c 1 = c 2 and there are no users assigned to link 1, user 1 cannot decrease its Individual Cost by switching from link 2 to link 1. So, user 1 is also satisfied in L.
It follows that L is a Nash equilibrium. Clearly,
• Construct now an assignment Q as follows: 
It follows that
We now prove the upper bound: Theorem 6.6 Consider the case of arbitrary users and related links. Then, PoA < m. Proof: Consider any arbitrary instance w, c with an associated Nash equilibrium L such that
for some integer p ∈ N, and an optimal assignment Q. To prove an upper bound on the Price of Anarchy, it suffices to prove an upper bound on p + 1. To do so, we will prove a lower bound (as a function of p) on the number of links that are necessary for such a Nash equilibrium L. We will then use this lower bound to prove an upper bound of m on p + 1. We continue with the details of the formal proof.
We prove an inductive claim: Lemma 6. Since L is a Nash equilibrium, user i 0 has no incentive to switch from its link l j , where j ∈ [i − 1], to link l i . Since user i 0 is assigned to link l i in Q, the additional latency on link l i in L due to user i 0 switching to link l i is at most the latency on link l i in Q; since Q is optimal, this additional latency is at most OPT (w, c). It follows that Λ lj (L) ≤ Λ li (L) + OPT (w, c) . 
Epilogue
We presented a comprehensive collection of lower and upper bounds on Price of Anarchy for the model of restricted parallel links, where we considered only pure Nash equilibria. The case of identical users is the only case for which we do not yet know tight bounds. Most important, what are tight bounds on Price of Anarchy (for the general case of arbitrary users and related links) when all (mixed) Nash equilibria are considered? Deriving such tight bounds remains an important open problem.
